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IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not providing the Boyers, who have owned and accessed 
their property for generations (over 100 years), the right to use the Middle Fork road to 
access their property. Based on the trial court's express findings, the public used the 
Middle Fork road to access the Blue Lakes for decades. Given the close proximity of the 
three lakes to one another and other evidence, it is virtually inconceivable that the public 
did not use the Middle Fork Road to access Boyer Lake and, thereby the Boyer Property. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, the lack of evidence showing the public used 
a specific route to travel across the last one-half mile of land necessary to reach the Boyer 
Property should not have precluded the trial court from providing the Boyers a remedy. 
The trial court also erred by failing to connect the East Fork Road to the Boyer 
Property. The evidence clearly established that even prior to 1929 a path existed from the 
middle of Section 8 to the Boyer Property. Contrary to the arguments of Haynes, the trial 
court found the public's use of this way was not interrupted until 1941, a period in excess 
often years. Although the public may have used this route less frequently than the 
Middle Fork road, the evidence clearly established that they could and did use this 
portion of the East Fork Road whenever they deemed it convenient to do so. Haynes' 
contention that the current route differs slightly from the old path should not have 
precluded the trial court from extending the road all the way to the Boyer Property. 
Finally, the trial court erred in granting sua sponte Water Users' a prescriptive 
easement across the Boyer Property. First, it is not necessary to travel across the Boyer 
Property to reach Boyer Reservoir. Second, that Water Users' reliance on the testimony 
1 
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of Dennis Wright is misplaced. During his testimony Dennis Wright does not even 
mention the road across the Boyer Property. Absent any evidence the Water Users have 
ever used this road (or even needed to) there was no basis to grant them an easement. 
I. CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE WATER USERS', 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXTENDING THE PUBLIC 
PORTION OF THE MIDDLE FORK ROAD TO THE BOYER 
PROPERTY. 
In its opposing brief, the Water Users' maintain that the trial court was correct in 
not extending the public portion of the Middle Fork road to the Boyer Property. Water 
users' Brief at 7-10. In support thereof, the Water Users' argue: 
1. Boyers failed to establish the public used the Middle Fork Road to access 
their property (Water Users' Brief at 7); and 
2. Boyers failed to establish that the public used a specific path across the last 
one-half mile of land necessary to reach the Boyer Property (Water Users' Brief at 8-10); 
For these reasons, the Water Users' contend that the trial court was correct in 
refusing to provide the Boyers, who have owned and accessed their property for over 100 
years, an independent legal right of their own to access their property.1 As set forth 
below, the Water Users' are mistaken. 
1
 An abutting landowner to a public road has a private easement in the road which 
services the abandonment or vacation of the highway. Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 468 
(Utah 1982). 
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A. Based Upon the Uncontroverted Facts of Record and the Trial 
Court's Own Findings, It Is Clear That the Public Used the 
Middle Fork Road to Access the Boyer Property. 
As set forth in Boyer5s initial brief, the trial court found that the Middle Fork Road 
to a point just one-half mile shy of the Boyer Property had been dedicated to the public 
because many people used it to gain "access to the Blue Lakes." R-Haynes at 1448-49 & 
1464 (emphasis added) and exhibits 173 & 174. 
Additionally, the court expressly found that the Blue Lakes consist of three lakes, 
which lakes have referred to in this litigation as Blue Lake, Boyer Lake and Joyce Lake. 
R-Haynes at 1410. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court held that Boyers' had failed 
to establish that the public used the Middle Fork Road to access Boyer Lake and, thereby, 
the Boyer Property. R-Haynes at 1464. For the reasons set forth below, this finding is 
contrary to the overwhelming evidence of record and constitutes clear error. 
The Blue Lakes are located in a high mountain basin in close proximity to one 
another. Exhibits 173 and 174. From where the trial court found the Middle Fork Road 
ended, Boyer Lake is located one-half mile (or less) to the north. Exhibits 173 and 174. 
Joyce Lake is located within a couple hundred yards of Boyer Lake to the north (exhibit 
173) and Blue Lake is located approximately one-half mile or so to the east. Exhibit 174. 
Given the close proximity to one another of those three lakes, it is virtually inconceivable 
that the public used the Middle Fork Road for decades to access the Blue Lakes, but did 
not use it to access Boyer Lake. Moreover, from what the court found to be the terminus 
of the Middle Fork Road, the most direct route to reach the Joyce Lake is to travel due 
north across the Boyer Property. Thus, to access Boyer Lake it is clear the public would 
3 
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have traveled across the Boyer Property. Exhibits 116, 173 and 174. It follows there 
from that unless the public was using the Middle Road only to access Blue Lake, they 
would almost necessarily have traveled across the Boyer Property. Finally, it is evident 
that the public was in fact interested in accessing Boyer Lake. Although the trial court 
found that the East Fork Road had not been dedicated to the public because of its more 
limited use (R-Haynes at 1454), it is undisputed the road went to Boyer Reservoir. Boyer 
Brief at 24; Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, ^[523-524. It defies reason and common sense to 
conclude that the fewer number of people using the East Fork Road would use that road 
to access Boyer Lake but that the larger number of people using the Middle Fork Road 
would not. 
B. The Lack of Evidence Depicting the Exact Route the Public 
Traveled Over the Last One-half Mile of Land to Reach Boyer 
Lake is not Fatal to the Establishment of a Public Road. 
In their brief, the Water Users' argue that the public cannot acquire an easement to 
travel generally over land wherever they want. Water Users' Brief at 8. Accordingly, the 
Water Users' argue for a public dedication to occur the road in question must have a 
specific and definite path over which the public traveled. Water Users' Brief at 8. 
Absent such a fixed path, the Water Users argue a public dedication could not have 
occurred no matter how long the public traveled over a portion or strip of ground to reach 
their destination. See Water Users Brief at 8. Because the evidence did not establish an 
exact course or line of travel across the last one-half mile of land necessary to reach 
Boyer Lake, therefore, the Water Users argue the court was correct in failing to recognize 
the Middle Fork Road extends all the way to the Boyer Property. 
4 
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Contrary to the suggestion of the Water Users, Utah Courts have never required a 
party to establish an exact path along the entire course of a road. For example, in Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929), there was evidence that travel 
over the road did not always follow an identical or uniform line but in some locations 
varied from a fixed line of travel. In affirming the lower court's determination that the 
road had nevertheless been dedicated to the public, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
With respect to the certainty of the line or course of the road, the 
evidence was also sufficient to support the decree. While the public 
cannol acquire a right by use to pass over a tract of land generally, 
but only in a certain line or way, it is not indispensable to the 
acquisition of the right that there should be no deviation in the use 
from a direct line of travel. If the travel has remained substantially 
unchanged, and the practical identity of the road preserved, it is 
sufficient, although there may have been slight deviations from the 
common way to avoid encroachments, obstacles, or obstructions 
upon the road. 
Id. at 649 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Sullivan v. Condas, 290 P. 954 (Utah 1930), 
the exact course the public traveled had changed over time. In affirming the lower 
court's determination of a public dedication, the Utah Supreme Court stated "[wjhatever 
change was made was slight and did not materially change or affect the general course of 
the highway or of its location nor break or change the continuity of travel or use." Id. at 
957-58 (emphasis added). 
Although, there is no fixed mathematical formula for determining what does or 
does not constitute a material deviation from a fixed path, it is clear what constitutes a 
material change or deviation depends on the particular facts and circumstances. In 
Schultz v. Department of Army, U.S., 10 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 1993) , the plaintiff claimed 
319498v1 
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he had a right to cross a military base in Alaska because the Army acquired that base 
subject to a valid existing R.S. 2477 right-of-way. The evidence at trial, however, did not 
show that the settlers using the road traveled across the land using a fixed path but varied 
depending upon the conditions. In concluding the lack of a fixed path did not preclude 
the finding of a R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the court stated: 
Due to its geography, its weather, and its sparse and scattered 
population, Alaska's "highways" frequently have been no more than 
trails and they have moved with the season and the purpose for the 
transit—what travelled best in winter could be impassable knee-deep 
swamp in summer; what best accommodated a sled was not the best 
route for a wagon or a horse or a person with a pack. By necessity 
routes shifted as the seasons shifted and as the uses shifted. What 
might be considered sporadic use in another context would be 
consistent or constant use in Alaska. We conclude that as long as 
the termini of the right of way are fixed (the homesteaders' cabins 
on one end, Fairbanks on the other), to establish public right of way 
the route in between need not be absolutely fixed. 
Id. at 655 (emphasis added). See also, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of 
Land Management, 425 F.3d 735, (10th Cir. 2005), wherein the court, after discussing 
the Schultz decision, recognized that analogous considerations might pertain to Utah, 
stating "the sparse population, rugged terrain, scarcity of passable routes, seasonal 
differences in snow, mud and stream flow, fragile and environmentally sensitive land, 
and paucity of towns or other centers of economic activity, could have an effect on the 
location of roads." Id. at 767. 
In the present instance, the road in dispute extends from Highway 133 to the Blue 
Lakes, a distance of approximately thirteen miles. See Exhibit 117. It is only with 
respect to the last one-half mile that there is any dispute concerning the location of the 
6 
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historical route of the road. Yet, even with regard to this segment of the road, it is clear 
to reach Boyer Lake the public would have traveled between the edge of the basin to the 
west and the ridge is the middle of the basin to the east. See Exhibits 173 and 174. 
Unlike the lower portion of the Middle Fork Road which cuts through dense 
timber and other growth, requiring travelers to keep to an established path, the basin is 
relatively flat and sparsely vegetated. Exhibits 173, 174 and 278. Thus, like in Schultz, 
the actual path of travel over the last one-half mile of land to reach Boyer Lake may have 
varied depending on snow drifts, seasonal springs, mud, water flow and the like, but such 
minor deviations over one-half mile of a thirteen mile road should not have precluded the 
trial court from finding that the Middle Fork Road extended to the Boyer Property. 
II. CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF HAYNES, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE EAST FORK ROAD IS 
NOT A PUBLIC ROAD ALL THE WAY TO THE BOYER 
PROPERTY. 
In its opposing brief, Haynes concedes that an established path existed from the 
middle of Section 8 to Boyer Lake (Haynes' Brief at 24), but argues that Boyers failed to 
establish it was used by the public continuously for ten years because (1) the use by 
LeRoy Meadows between 1929 and 1931 was permissive, and (2) Boyers failed to 
marshal evidence showing Haynes' actions interrupted the public's use of the road from 
In their initial brief, Boyers set forth that the last segment of the Middle Fork road was 
relocated and succeeded to the public status of the old road. Boyer Brief at 23. In their 
brief, the Water Users do not dispute that a relocated public road succeeds to the status of 
the old road - only that the old road did not extend to the Boyer Property. Water Users 
Brief at 10. Since that issue is addressed herein, Boyer does not readdress the relocation 
of the Middle Fork Road in this brief but see the discussion herein concerning the East 
Fork road in part II. B. 
319498vl 
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1932 onward. In addition, Haynes argues Boyers failed to marshal evidence showing the 
current path of the road is in a different location than the old route and other evidence 
showing the use of the roads was permissive. 
These arguments are addressed below. 
A. The Evidence of Record Clearly Established the East Fork Road 
was Used "Continuously" for Over "Ten" Years. 
(i) By arguing that the public's use of the subject roads was 
interrupted from 1932 onward, Haynes is trying to 
re-litigate the trial court's factual finding that this did not 
occur until 1941. 
Boyers concede that during the trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether 
Howard Haynes, Sr. took actions commencing in 1932 to interrupt the public's use of the 
road. In the Memorandum Decision, however, the trial court found that this did not occur 
until 1941, stating: 
After all the conflicts in that testimony concerning the use of the 
properties, the gates and locks and signs, the court finds that after 
Howard Haynes Sr. bought the final portion of the Haynes property 
in 1941 the gates were locked most of the time and it was the intent 
of Haynes to keep people off the property. . . . Factually since 1941 
the Bench Road and the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road 
have been private roads and have not become public roads through 
usage by the public since that time. 
R-Haynes at 1436-37. 
The Boyers have not challenged this finding and, therefore, had no obligation to 
marshal the evidence in contravention to it. More importantly, given the evidence that in 
1929 an established trail already existed beyond the middle of Section 8 (Dep. of LeRoy 
319498v1 
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Meadows, pp.13 & 14), it is therefore clear the road was in existence for more than ten 
years before Haynes interrupted any public use thereof. 
(ii) The record clearly evidences that the public used the East 
Fork Road continuously for more than ten years. 
Even though Haynes now concedes that Wright did not own the land comprising 
the Blue Lakes or the land the upper portion of the East Fork Road traverses (Haynes 
Brief at 23), Haynes continues to argue the use of the road by LeRoy Meadows and his 
friends between 1929 and 1931 was permissive because Wright might have been 
"leasing" the property. Haynes Brief at 23. Aside from the fact Wright was a livestock 
operator (Haynes Brief at 23), Haynes' offers absolutely no evidence to support such a 
conclusion or that such a "grazing" lease would give Wright the authority to let others 
recreate on somebody else's land. Thus, it is clear Meadows and his group were 
trespassers and, thereby public users. 
In any event, Haynes is missing the broader point. When LeRoy Meadows and his 
friends went to the Blue Lakes in 1929, he testified there already existed an established 
path which they traveled with their horse and buggy. Given the trial courts determination 
the lower portion of the road had been dedicated to the public between 1880 and 1896 
and the public's use of the road had not been interrupted until 1941, it is clear that the 
public was free to and did use the road whenever they deed it convenient to do so. 
319498vl 
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B. Even Assuming the Existing Route of the East Fork Road 
Beyond Section 8 Does Not Follow the Same Exact Path as the 
Old Route, It Does Not Follow that the Trial Court was Correct 
in Failing to Extend the Public Portion of the East Fork Road to 
Boyer Lake. 
For the first time in this litigation, Haynes asserts that the existing route of the East 
Fork Road (beyond Section 8) is different from the old route and that Boyers failed to 
marshal the evidence on this point. Because Haynes did not argue this before the trial 
court, the trial court did not render a finding or even address this issue in rendering its 
decision. See, R-Haynes at 1393-1475. Consequently, Boyers did not marshal this 
evidence. 
Nevertheless, even assuming the new road and the old road do not follow the exact 
same path, it does not follow that the trial court was correct in failing to declare the East 
Fork Road a public road all the way to the Boyer Property. Under Utah law, the public's 
interest in a road, once established, can only be extinguished by strict adherence to the 
statutory procedures required to do so. State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 132 P.3d 687, 699-
700 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In this instance, Summit County has never vacated the road. 
Assuming this court determines that this road was dedicated to the public, therefore, a 
public road must still exist today. 
It is also clear that the relocation of a public road having the same termini and 
which follows the same general course as the old road can succeed to the public status of 
the prior road. See e.g., Central P.R. Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463, 467, 52 S.Ct. 
225, 226, 76 L. Ed. 402, 405 (1932); Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
319498vl 
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1982); Sullivan v. Condas, 290 P. 954, 957-58 (Utah 1930); and Western Aggregates, Inc. 
v. County of Yuba, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 457-59 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2002). 
In Central P. R. Co., the United States Supreme Court discussed the common law 
rule regarding deviations in highways: 
The original road was formed by the passage of wagons, etc., over 
the natural soil, and we know, as a matter of ordinary observation, 
that in such cases the line of travel is subject to occasional deviations 
owing to changes brought about by storms, temporary obstructions, 
and other causes. But, so far as the specific parcels of land here in 
dispute are concerned, we find nothing in the record to compel the 
conclusion that any departure from the line of the original highway 
was of such extent as to destroy the identity of the road as originally 
laid out and used. 
Central P.R. Co., 52 S. Ct. at 226. 
In Western Aggregates, various segments of the original road had been relocated 
due to the rerouting of the Yuba River, strip mining and other activities, such that in 
places it was no longer possible to even identify the original path. In concluding the 
existing road was the functional equivalent of the prior public road, the court reasoned 
reasoned: 
This reflects the common sense idea that the road's importance may 
lie in the points it connects. The "fair inference" is the road 
connects points, completing a throughway, even if the intermediate 
route changes. (See Wilkensen, supra, 634 F.Supp. at pp. 1275-
1276, quoting Central P.R., supra 284 U.S. 463, 52 S.Ct. 225, 76 
L.Ed. 402.) Professor Bader lists as typical those R.S. 2477 roads 
uused to connect two or more distinct locations. Examples include 
routes which are the primary means between towns or which link 
two transportation arteries, or which once served as stage lines.5' 
Here, the County wants the right to go through Western's lands, not 
to recreate the old route. 
Western Aggregates, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457-59. 
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In Memmott v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a public road 
which has been relocated succeeds to the status of the old road. In that case, certain 
landowners closed a portion of a public road located in Millard County and relocated that 
road across their land because mining activities in proximity to the road had created a 
dangerous condition. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the road from being relocated because 
it required him to travel an additional 1,800 feet to reach his mining claim. In denying 
the plaintiffs claim for an injunction, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the closing of 
a road and the providing of a new road . . . does not constitute a deprivation of reasonable 
access to the public roads." 642 P.2d at 752. Thus, the court necessarily recognized that 
where the relocated road has the same termini, and the landowner over whose land a 
roadway changes voices no objection (or changes the route) the new route succeeds to the 
status of the old route. 
There is no mathematical formula for determining the degree to which the location 
of a road can be changed before it loses its identity. See, e.g., Western Aggregates, 130 
Cal Rptr. 2d at 458. Whatever the degree of change, it must be material in that it changes 
the nature or the degree of the servitude imposed. Id; Ward v. City of Monrovia, 108 
P.2d 425, 429 (Ca. 1940). Thus, "the distance to which a roadway may be changed 
without destroying an easement will be determined somewhat by the character of the land 
over which it passes, together with the value improvements, and purposes to which the 
land is adopted." Western Aggregates, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458. 
In the present instance, the existing route and the old route (if in fact any different) 
have the same termini and follow the same general course along the East Fork of the 
12 
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Chalk Creek up to Blue Lake. Both the old route and existing route cross over lands that 
have been and are being used for grazing and recreation. The purpose of the new route is 
the same as the old; to wit, access to Boyer Lake and surrounding property. There is no 
evidence whatsoever that the use of the existing route would in any way increase the 
nature or degree of the servitude. 
Furthermore, Haynes should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. 
See e.g., Western Aggregates, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458. By preventing the public's use of 
the road since 1941 it is unlikely the route of the old road is even ascertainable. Thus, 
Haynes should not be entitled to object to the substitution of the existing route for the old 
route. 
For the foregoing reasons, the existing route should be deemed to have succeeded 
to the public status of the old route. 
C. Boyers Did Not Fail to Otherwise Marshall the Evidence. 
Haynes also alleges Boyers failed to marshal evidence the people using the road were 
permissive users. Haynes Brief at pp 21-24. By finding that all but the top portions of 
the subject roads had been dedicated to the public, however, the trial court obviously 
concluded the users were members of the public. This is consistent with Fern Boyers5 
testimony that in those days "it was just like wide open country. There were no gates or 
fences" and that she did not ask anyone permission to use the road. Trial Transcript, 
Vol. II, p. 431. Haynes is not entitled to relitigate this issue on appeal. Moreover, 
Haynes does not every address why Wayne Jones' testimony concerning the road after 
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Haynes interrupted the public's use is even relevant. See Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, 
pp. 795-796. 
III. CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE WATER USERS, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WATER USERS 
AN EASEMENT OVER THE BOYER PROPERTY. 
In their opposing brief, the Water Users argue the trial court was correct in 
granting them a prescriptive easement across the Boyer Property because (1) the evidence 
of record sustains such a determination, and (2) in any event, no prejudice occurred 
because the Water Users have an express easement to travel across the Boyer Property. 
By so arguing, the Water Users are attempting to purposefully mislead this court. Water 
Users'Brief at 10-13. 
Boyers do not dispute that since the construction of the reservoir representatives of 
the Water Users have used the East Fork Road to access the reservoir. What the Water 
Users conveniently fail to reveal to this court, however, is that the Water Users' property, 
which contains the dam spillway, turnout, etc., is located along the road prior to reaching 
the Boyer Property. See, Ex 117 There is no evidence whatsoever that the water 
company ever used the road across the Boyer Property for any reason let along openly, 
notoriously and adversely for a period of twenty years. During his testimony, Dennis 
Wright did not even mention the Boyer Property or the road traversing it. Absent any 
evidence the Water Users actually used (or even need to) the road across the Boyer 
Property, it is absolutely clear they failed to establish the elements necessary to obtain a 
prescriptive easement. 
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The Water Users5 reliance on the written easement is equally misleading. In this 
easement, the Wright brothers granted to the Chalk Creek Water Company an easement 
across their property, not the Boyer Property. Thus, the written easement relied upon by 
the Water Users does grant it the right to me the road across the Boyer Property. 
IV. UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PUBLIC'S USE OF THE SUBJECT 
ROADS IS NOT DEEMED TO BE PERMISSIVE, NOR IS ACTUAL 
INTENT TO DEDICATE REQUIRED. 
Although the Boyers concede that some jurisdictions presume the use of open, 
unenclosed lands is permissive, such is not the law in Utah. See, e.g., Boyer v. Clark, 326 
P.2d 107, 108-110 (Utah 1958) md Lindsay, 285 P 646, 646-649 (Utah 1930), wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court concluded the subject roads had been dedicated to the public 
despite the fact the roads crossed over open unenclosed lands. Haynes' reliance on the 
language quoted from Wilson v. Hull, 24 P.799, 800 (Utah 1890) on page 45 of its initial 
brief is misplaced. While early Utah decisions used to require an actual intent on the part 
of a landowner for a dedication to occur (see, e.g., Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 
(Utah 1916), such intent is no longer required. See, e.g., Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 
447, 449 (Utah 1981). 
Further, Haynes' argument that the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the 
requirement of an actual intent to dedicate in Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768 
(Utah 2008), mistakes the holding of the case. In Okelberry, the Utah Supreme Court set 
forth the following bright line test for determining whether an interruption in use has 
occurred: 
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An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use 
of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do 
so, constitutes an interruption sufficient to restart the running of the 
required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute. 
Id, at 774. Okelberry, therefore, requires an intent to interrupt, not an intent to dedicate. 
See also Jacob-Christensen Brief, pp. 47-48. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the trial court erred in not extending the East Fork Road and Middle 
Fork Road all the way to the Boyer Property. The evidence of record clearly established 
that both roads were used to access the Boyer Property whenever the public desired to do 
so for more than ten years. Conversely, there is absolutely no evidence of record to 
sustain the granting of a prescriptive easement in favor of the Water Users across the 
Boyer Property. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2009. 
/ J ^ H 7 ^ By: /J/U TA^ 
Brent A. Bohman 
Attorney for Gregory Boyer, 
Gerald Boyer, Fern Boyer and 
Eugene Hansen 
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